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Dehumanization is a complex social phenomenon, intimately connected to intergroup
harm and neglect. However, developmental research has only recently started to inves-
tigate this important topic. In this chapter, we review research in areas closely related to
dehumanization including children’s intergroup preferences, essentialist conceptions of
social groups, and understanding of relative status. We then highlight the small number
of recent studies that have investigated the development of this social bias more
directly. We close by making a series of suggestions for future research that will enable
us to better understand the nature and causes of this harmful phenomenon.
1. INTRODUCTION
The negative effects of undermining a person’s humanity (dehu-
manization) have been documented in historical literature (Allport, 1954;
Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; O’Brien, 2003; Tirrell, 2012) and continue to
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be relevant today. Dehumanization is an integral aspect of racism and other
forms of prejudice ( Jahoda, 1999; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill,
2015; Smith, 2012). Throughout Western Europe and the United States,
portrayals of immigrant groups in the media and political debates have sub-
tly, and sometimes explicitly, questioned the human status of these individ-
uals (Esses, Medianu, & Lawson, 2013; Sanneh, 2016; Schmuck &Matthes,
2015; Shah, 2015).When individuals are dehumanized, they are more likely
to be treated harshly (Bandura, 1999; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson,
2008; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013) and less likely to receive humanitarian
aid (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014;
Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007).
A great deal of research has investigated the origins of stereotyping, prej-
udice, and discrimination among young children (Aboud, 1988; Banaji,
Baron, Dunham, &Olson, 2008; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Over, 2017). How-
ever, studies investigating the development of dehumanization have, until
recently, been rare. It is not clear why dehumanization has been overlooked
by developmental psychologists. Perhaps it is because paradigms used to
study this phenomenon often involve comprehension of higher order emo-
tions and traits (Bain, Vaes, Kashima, Haslam, & Guan, 2011; Chas,
Betancor, Rodrı́guez-Perez, & Delgado, 2015; Demoulin et al., 2004)
and rely on complex verbal instructions. Despite this challenge, a handful
of recent studies have started to directly investigate dehumanization among
children.
The study of dehumanization is interesting for developmentalists
because, as well as being a predictor of intergroup harm and neglect
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Cehajic, Brown, &
González, 2009; Moller & Deci, 2009), dehumanization is closely related
to central topics within the field of social cognitive development including
essentialism (Hirschfeld, 1995, 1996) and mental state attribution (Wellman,
2002; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). In this chapter, we discuss influential
accounts of dehumanization from the social psychological and philosophical
literatures and then use this research as a basis from which to understand the
developmental origins of this phenomenon in young children. We expect
that this line of research will provide insight into difficulties children face
in their social lives, for example, in the form of bullying and discrimination
(Bastian &Haslam, 2010; Obermann, 2011). In addition, we hope that iden-
tifying how dehumanizing biases originate in development may ultimately
contribute to research-led interventions to improve intergroup relations
among children (for e.g., see Aboud et al., 2012).
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2. CONCEPTUALIZING DEHUMANIZATION
A basic definition of dehumanization is relatively easy to summarize—
it involves the belief that certain individuals (most commonly members of
particular social groups) are less human than others (Tajfel, 1981; Vaes,
Leyens, Paladino, &Miranda, 2012). Beyond this basic definition, however,
accounts differ in terms of what they consider to be the key features of the
phenomenon.
Early social psychological theorizing on this topic sought to understand
how dehumanization relates to genocidal atrocities and mass violence com-
mitted in times of war (Bar-Tal, 1989; Schwartz & Struch, 1989; Staub,
1989). Work in this tradition focused on the idea that dehumanization
involved a weakening of moral inhibitions against causing harm to others
(Bandura, 1991, 1999; Kelman, 1973) and a tendency to exclude them from
moral consideration (Opotow, 1990).
Smith (2012) analyzed the concept of dehumanization in greater detail
and provided an empirically informed philosophical account of what is
involved in considering a group to be “less than human.” He delineates cer-
tain features of this process that appear to be shared across atrocities perpe-
trated against marginalized groups. He argues that, to be dehumanized, an
outgroup member must be denied a human “essence.” Although a deni-
grated social group may appear to be physically human, they lack an essen-
tial, inner human quality. This outlook is linked to an assumption of
outgroup homogeneity, i.e., that each member of the dehumanized group
lacks a human essence. Smith (2012) also points out the dehumanization is
closely associated with a perception that the dehumanized group is not only
disliked but also lower in status—the group is not just unhuman but less
than human.
Recent psychological research has extended the focus of dehumanization
research beyond the study of extreme violence to incorporate more implicit
and everyday examples of the phenomenon present in society more broadly.
Researchers in this tradition have sought to empirically establish which traits
and characteristics individuals associate with humanness (e.g., see Demoulin
et al., 2004; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005) and used their attri-
bution of these qualities to understand differential perceptions of in- and
outgroup members.
Leyens et al. (2000, 2001) were the first to operationalize the more subtle
and relative way we ascribe humanness to different groups. Similar to
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Smith (2012), Leyens et al. (2000) assumed that adults reserve a perceived
human essence for members of their own social groups. To study this claim
empirically, Leyens et al. (2000) first established which traits adults typically
include in their concept of humanity. They suggested that “humanness” was
associated with intelligence, language, reasoning, and emotions. Choosing
to focus on emotions, they further suggested that secondary emotions
such as remorse, admiration, and nostalgia are specifically connected to
humanness, whereas basic emotions such as sadness, fear, and pleasure are
shared between humans and other animals (Ekman, 1992). Their experi-
mental work revealed that adults attribute secondary emotions more
strongly to members of their own group than to members of other social
groups (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Cortes, Demoulin,
Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2009). This more
subtle form of dehumanization dealing with emotion perception is referred
to as “infrahumanization.”
Haslam (2006) developed a related theory that also concentrated on the
ways in which we assign uniquely human characteristics to members of dif-
ferent social groups. Haslam argues that we conceptualize humanness along
two dimensions: one based on the comparison between human and animals
(similar to infrahumanization) and another based on the comparison
between humans and automata (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Haslam refers
to the denial of uniquely human traits (e.g., rationality, culture) as animalistic
dehumanization and argues that it is linked to feelings of disgust for an out-
group. He refers to denial of human nature traits (e.g., individuality,
warmth) as mechanistic dehumanization and reasons that it facilitates the
perception of psychological distance from an outgroup. In this conceptual-
ization, dehumanization is viewed as a continuum, where associations
between outgroups and animalistic and/or mechanistic concepts can lead
to serious harm (e.g., proclivity for torture and sexual aggression;
Rudman & Mescher, 2012; Viki et al., 2013) or to less serious violations
(e.g., a reduced willingness to help; Andrighetto et al., 2014).
Leyens et al. (2001) and Haslam (2006) both allude to the idea that the
concept of humanness is connected to the concept of having a mind. For
some researchers, a reduced tendency to attribute mental states to outgroup
members is the defining feature of dehumanization. Harris and Fiske (2009,
2011) conceptualize dehumanization as the failure to spontaneously con-
sider the mental life of others. This definition is situated within the stereo-
type content model of social perception (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002)
which posits that adults evaluate social groups on their perceived warmth
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and competence. Ingroup members are regarded to be high on both dimen-
sions but members of certain outgroups (e.g., drug addicts, homeless people)
fall into the low–low quadrant and are thus vulnerable to dehumanizing per-
ceptions. Harris and Fiske (2006) provided neuroscientific data suggesting
that participants display less activity in brain regions associated with
mentalizing (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex; Amodio & Frith, 2006;
Frith & Frith, 2006) and use fewer mental state verbs when considering
the life of, for example, a homeless person.
It is clear even from this short summary that dehumanization is a com-
plex and contested concept and that dehumanizing biases can take different
forms (Bain, 2014; Fiske, 2009; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Opotow, 1990;
Smith, 2014). The particular definition adopted has implications for our
understanding of the developmental origins and trajectory of the phenom-
enon, as we discuss in more detail. For now, we note that certain themes
emerge as common across the definitions we have presented. Dehumaniza-
tion is commonly associated with the denial of mental states and human-like
traits to perceived outgroups, reasoning about social groups in essentialist
terms, and considering outgroup members as both less likeable than ingroup
members and lower in status. In the next two sections, we briefly outline
developmental research on each of these topics.
3. CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF HUMANNESS
If dehumanization involves the perception of others as “less than
human” (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Kteily
et al., 2015; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Smith,
2012), then it follows that to dehumanize other social groups it is first nec-
essary to understand something about what it means to be human. Next, we
discuss how children begin to reason about human and nonhuman agents
and the emergence of mental state understanding.
3.1 Perception of Agency
Developmental research has tended to focus not on children’s explicit
understanding of “humanness” but rather on how children come to differ-
entiate animate from inanimate agents (Legerstee, 1992) and on the type of
the expectations they form about these animate entities ( Johnson, 2000).
Empirical work has demonstrated that infants distinguish between the
actions of human and nonhuman agents and reason about them differently
(Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). For example, infants appear
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to infer that human actions are driven by internal goals and intentions,
whereas the actions of mechanical devices are not (Meltzoff, 1995;
Woodward, 1998; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). Certain cues seem
to be particularly important in influencing the attribution of agency: the
presence of facial features, self-propelled motion, and whether an agent
engages in some form of contingent, social interaction (Beier & Carey,
2014; Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998; Leslie, 1994; Premack, 1990).
When considering children’s perception of agency, it is interesting that
research with infants and young children often uses animated characters
rather than human actors as stimuli (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007;
Johnson, 2003; Over & Carpenter, 2009; Song, Over, & Carpenter,
2015; Springer, Meier, & Berry, 1996). These stimuli can often be as simple
as moving shapes (Hamlin et al., 2007). It appears that children readily attri-
bute social qualities to characters of this type (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011;
Powell & Spelke, 2013), perhaps reflecting the origins of anthropomorphism
in which children overattribute human-like qualities to nonhuman agents.
Other work has focused more directly on anthropomorphism and shown
that younger children are more likely to anthropomorphize animals and
inanimate objects than are older children (Kahn et al., 2012; Severson &
Lemm, 2016).
3.2 Mental State Understanding
Researchers from several different traditions have converged on the idea that
concept of humanity is closely related to having a mind (Harris & Fiske, 2011;
Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). In developmental research, “theory of
mind” refers to the capacity to understand that other people possess mental
states that are independent from, and sometimes different to, our own
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & Perner,
1983). From a very young age, children are able to reason about the intentions
(Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 1995), desires (Repacholi
& Gopnik, 1997), and perhaps even the beliefs (Buttelmann, Carpenter, &
Tomasello, 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra,
2007) of others (although see Heyes, 2014; Wellman, Cross, & Watson,
2001 for alternative accounts). Other research has examined the development
of emotion understanding and suggested that 5-year-old children can
make inferences about complex emotions such as guilt and remorse (Vaish,
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2011). Children’s comprehension of uniquely
human emotions continues to develop significantly throughout middle
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childhood. For example, the experience and understanding of secondary emo-
tions, including embarrassment, pride, and shame, steadily increase between
the ages of 5 and 12 years of age (Bennett, 1989; Buss, Iscoe, & Buss, 1979;
Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987; Seidner, Stipek, & Feshbach,
1988; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).
4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERGROUP BIAS
Research investigating the origins of intergroup cognition has
established that some of the psychological constructs linked to dehumaniza-
tion are present from relatively early in development. In the next section, we
briefly outline developmental research on essentialist beliefs about social
groupmembers (Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), perceptions of outgroup
homogeneity (Bennett et al., 2004; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin,
2003), negativity toward outgroup members (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble,
& Fuligni, 2001), and sensitivity to the relative status of different groups
(Nesdale & Flesser, 2001).
4.1 Social Essentialism
A number of prominent theories have conceptualized dehumanization as
denying a human essence to members of other groups (Haslam &
Loughnan, 2014; Leyens, 2009; Smith, 2012, 2014). Essentialism refers to
the belief that members of social groups share inherent and unchangeable
traits that remain true of groupmembers evenwhen their physical appearance
changes (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Prentice &
Miller, 2007). Empirical research has examined essentialism in general rather
than the attribution of a specifically “human essence.” This research has illus-
trated that young children often assume that members of particular genders
(Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009), language
groups (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012), races (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004;
Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Waxman, 2010), and ethnicities (Birnbaum, Deeb,
Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006)
share underlying qualities in common. Individual differences in the tendency
to essentialize particular social groups predict the amount of stereotyping
children engage in about those groups (Gelman, 2004; Pauker, Ambady, &
Apfelbaum, 2010), and essentialized groupmembers are less likely to beoffered
resources when children make sharing decisions (Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders,
Dunham, & Cimpian, 2017).
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Related to essentialized concepts of social groups, Smith (2012) argues
that dehumanization involves believing that outgroup members are homo-
genous in their lack of a human essence. The phenomenon of “outgroup
homogeneity” (Quattrone & Jones, 1980; Simon, 1992) refers to the belief
that outgroup members are more similar to each other in their traits than are
ingroup members who are thought of as having more varied and unique
qualities. McGlothin and colleagues studied perceptions of outgroup homo-
geneity in the context of racial groups and showed that 6- and 9-year-old
White children estimate that two Black children are more likely to hold
the same interests than are two White children (McGlothlin & Killen,
2005; McGlothlin, Killen, & Edmonds, 2005).
4.2 Outgroup Negativity
Dehumanization is thought to typically cooccur alongside a negative view of
the dehumanized group. Researchers interested in the use of dehumanizing
metaphors have pointed out that outgroupmembers are usually compared to
animals or entities that have negative connotations (e.g., “disgusting” rats
and “threatening” beasts; Buckels & Trapnell, 2013; Goff et al., 2008;
Jahoda, 1999; Tirrell, 2012). From early in development, children hold both
explicit and implicit preferences for members of their own social groups over
members of other social groups. Within Western contexts, young children
prefer members of their own gender (La Freniere, Strayer, & Gauthier,
1984; Martin & Ruble, 2004; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010; Yee &
Brown, 1994), language (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013;
Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007), and sometimes racial group (Baron &
Banaji, 2006; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2007;
Kircher & Furby, 1971). Indeed, ingroup positivity can be induced in
lab-based settings with novel groups based on arbitrary criteria (Dunham,
Baron, & Carey, 2011; Richter, Over, & Dunham, 2016).
Evidence of outgroup negativity appears to emerge somewhat later in
development than ingroup preference (Brewer, 1999). Buttelmann and
B€ohm (2014), for example, found that 8-year-old, but not 6-year-old, par-
ticipants opted to give undesirable items to members of a perceived out-
group (see also Aboud, 2003; Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015). Whereas
some researchers have provided evolutionary explanations for this develop-
mental trajectory (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 1997), others have
emphasized the role of learning in the emergence of outgroup negativity
(Over, Eggleston, Bell, & Dunham, 2017).
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4.3 Relative Status
Dehumanization is associated with perceptions of a group’s social status as
dehumanized groups are generally perceived as lesser or inferior beings
(Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, & Falvo, 2011; Harris & Fiske,
2006; Smith, 2012; Vaes & Paladino, 2009; Viki & Calitri, 2008). Develop-
mental work has suggested that young children are sensitive to the hierar-
chical nature of society (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Shutts, Kinzler,
Katz, Tredoux, & Spelke, 2011). This sensitivity emerges relatively early—
children as young as 3 years of age associate wealth with higher status racial
groups (Olson, Shutts, Kinzler, & Weisman, 2012). Children’s knowledge
of the relative status of group members also impacts their judgements of
novel occupations. They are more likely to perceive a job as prestigious
when it is performed by a White male (Bigler, Averhart, & Liben, 2003;
Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2001). Furthermore, the perceived status of a social
group influences young children’s intergroup attitudes. Several studies have
revealed that children favor members of high status groups (Horwitz,
Shutts, & Olson, 2014; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; Newheiser & Olson,
2012; Shutts et al., 2011).
From reviewing the literature, many of the features typically associated
with dehumanization are in place from relatively early in development.
In what remains of this chapter, we will review the small but growing body
of research that directly investigates dehumanization among children.
5. DEHUMANIZATION AMONG CHILDREN
Van Noorden, Haselager, Cillessen, and Bukowski (2014) devel-
oped a measure to assess mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization in chil-
dren (aged 7–12 years) toward groups defined on friendship status. The
participants were asked whether six aspects of humanness applied to peers
who either were or were not their friends. Three of these aspects of human-
ness were related to human nature/mechanistic qualities (i.e., trustworthy,
friendly, sociable), and three were related to uniquely human/animalistic
qualities (i.e., humble, thorough, polite). Van Noorden et al. (2014) found
that children attributed significantly more human traits of both types to fri-
ends than to nonfriends. In a related study, Costello and Hodson (2014)
examined how children understood dehumanization in a racial group con-
text. Focusing on animalistic forms of dehumanization, they found that 6- to
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10-year-old White children thought Black children possessed fewer
uniquely human traits (e.g., curiosity, creativity) and emotions (e.g., embar-
rassment, guilt) than did ingroup members. An interesting facet of their
findings was that this bias was associated with a stronger endorsement of
the divide between humans and animals.
Further research has investigated biases in emotion attribution
(infrahumanization) with children and adolescents in peer group contexts.
For example, in a longitudinal study, 11- and 16-year-old participants
who had infrequent contact with students from another educational institu-
tion were less likely to specify complex emotions (e.g., sympathy, hope) in
their evaluation of these outgroup peers (Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace,
2007). In closely related research, Chas et al. (2015) found that 11- and
12-year-olds attributed fewer secondary emotions (e.g., enthusiasm, stress)
to fans of a sports team with whom they were competing. Martin, Bennett,
and Murray (2008) also used a similar paradigm to assess the development of
infrahumanization in younger children. They asked 6- to 7-year-old and
10- to 11-year-old Scottish participants to rate the intensity of primary
(e.g., anger) and secondary emotions (e.g., pride) experienced by their
national football team and the English football team after a loss and a
win. Children across both age groups predicted that ingroup members
would experience more intense secondary emotions compared to primary
emotions. In comparison, their intensity ratings for the outgroup did not
vary depending on the type of emotion in question. Taken together, these
results seem to provide an interesting parallel to research on dehumanization
and infrahumanization with adults (Boccato et al., 2007; Castano et al.,
2009; Gaunt, Sindic, & Leyens, 2005). However, it remains for future
research to determine whether children conceive of humanness in a similar
way as do adults (e.g., see Betancor Rodriguez, Chas Villar, Rodriguez-
Perez, & Delgado Rodriguez, 2016).
McLoughlin, Tipper, andOver (2017) recently investigated the origin of
dehumanizing perceptions. Across two studies, they presented 5- and
6-year-old children with ambiguous doll-human faces and asked them to
rate how human they believed the faces were on a 4-point scale (0¼Not
human, 1¼A little human, 2¼A medium amount human, 3¼Completely
human; see Fig. 1A). In one study, the group division was based on gender
(see Fig. 1B), and in another study, the group division was based on geo-
graphical location (see Fig. 1C). The older children (6-year-olds) perceived
the faces to be less human when they belonged to the outgroup, and this





A little bit A medium amount A lot
Fig. 1 Materials for McLoughlin et al. (2017): (A) the 4-pointmeasurement scale that was
used tomeasure children’s perception of humanness, (B) an example test trial in Study 1
with gender groups, and (C) an example test trial in Study 2 with geographically based
groups. The face morph stimuli were originally developed by Looser and Wheatley
(2010) and were kindly made available by Hackel, Looser, and Van Bavel (2014).
163The Developmental Origins of Dehumanization
effect held across both types of group manipulation. Importantly, this devel-
opmental pattern appeared to be driven by a decrease in children’s human-
ness ratings for outgroup members rather than an increase in their
humanness ratings of ingroup members. This developmental trend is mir-
rored in work examining the related construct of pain perception
(Loughnan et al., 2010;Waytz, Gray, Epley, &Wegner, 2010). In two stud-
ies, White children’s belief that Black children feel less pain than do other
White children gradually emerged between the ages of 5 and 10 (Dore,
Hoffman, Lillard, & Trawalter, 2014; Dore, Hoffman, Lillard, &
Trawalter, 2017). Interestingly, both McLoughlin et al. (2017) and Dore
et al. (2014) also found that increases in children’s dehumanizing biases were
not correlated with their explicit preferences for members of their
own group.
Other relevant research has shown that, like adults (Harris & Fiske,
2011), children spontaneously refer to mental states less often when describ-
ing the behavior of outgroupmembers.McLoughlin andOver (2017a) pres-
ented 5- and 6-year-olds with animations that depict interacting geometric
shapes known to elicit mental state language in children and adults (Abell,
Happe, & Frith, 2000; Springer et al., 1996). As in McLoughlin et al.
(2017) the perceived group membership of the characters was manipulated
across two social categories—gender and geographical origin. Children
spontaneously produced fewer mental state words when describing the
behavior of animated characters they believed belonged to their outgroups.
Older children (6-year-olds) also referred to a smaller number of unique
mental state terms when describing members of other social groups (see
Tables 1 and 2 for an example description and coding of that description).
In other words, their descriptions of outgroup members’ mental states were
less diverse. Although broadly related to the topic of dehumanization, it
remains unclear whether this is an example of outgroup dehumanization
per se. There may be contexts in which we do not attribute complex mental
states to others but do not dehumanize them either. For example, people
attribute less of a mind to babies than they do to adults (Gray, Gray, &
Wegner, 2007) but they probably do not dehumanize babies in other ways
(Smith, 2012). Furthermore, some individuals, such as those with autism,
may be less likely to spontaneously reflect on the mental states of other peo-
ple in general (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, &
Schultz, 2012) but there is no evidence to suggest that they are more likely to
dehumanize other groups.
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Table 1 Example of a Child’s Description of Gender In- and Outgroup Characters
(McLoughlin & Over, 2017a)
Condition Prompt Response
Ingroup “What do you think was
happening in the video?”
“So, hmmm, so like that one was knocking
on the door and then that one didn’t know
who it was so she hi-, so that one hided
behind it because she was going to scare
her”
“What do you think the
girls were doing?”
“Maybe they were having like a little game
and they have to just scare each other”
“Tell me about this girl” “She was inside and wondering who was
outside knocking on the door”
“Tell me about this girl” “That girl was cheeky and wanted to scare
her”
Outgroup “What do you think was
happening in the video?”
“They were, they were like dancing inside
the, that’s going to be the house, and
they’re dancing inside their house and then
that one decided to play outside and his
‘nother friend didn’t want to play outside
so he bringed him outside”
“What do you think the
boys were doing?”
“And then they had a little dance”
“Tell me about this boy” “Hmm, he wanted to stay outside”
“Tell me about this boy” “He wanted to stay in”
Table 2 Coding of the Example Description for Mental State Content (McLoughlin &
Over, 2017a)





Ingroup to know, to scare (3), to
wonder, cheeky, to want
7 5
Outgroup to decide, to want (3) 4 2
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6. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The concept of dehumanization has only quite recently been intro-
duced into the developmental literature. As a result, a great many questions
offer themselves as important topics for future research.We highlight a small
number of questions that we deem to be particularly interesting.
One question that comes immediately to mind is when in develop-
ment different aspects of dehumanizing biases first appear. Understanding
this question depends, in part, upon how dehumanization is concep-
tualized. If dehumanization is operationalized as an explicit belief that out-
group members are less than human, then it follows that children must be
able to understand at least something about the concepts of “humanness”
and relative status before they can dehumanize others (Betancor
Rodriguez et al., 2016; Chas et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2008; Smith,
2012; Van Noorden et al., 2014). However, if dehumanization is defined
as failure to attribute mental states to outgroup members (Harris & Fiske,
2009; Waytz, Gray, et al., 2010), then young children might show signs of
this damaging bias before they are able to explicitly articulate what it means
to be human.
A related question concerns the nature of the developmental trajectory of
dehumanization. At least two possibilities present themselves. First, children
may initially attribute human-like qualities equally to members of their own
group and other groups but come, over time, to dehumanize members of
perceived outgroups. Evidence for this developmental pattern is supported
to some extent byMcLoughlin et al. (2017) who found that 6-year-olds per-
ceived less humanness in outgroup faces than did 5-year-olds and Dore and
colleagues who showed that the belief outgroup children experience less
pain than do ingroup children increases with age (Dore et al., 2014,
2017). An alternative possibility is that children may differ in their percep-
tions of ingroup and outgroup members from as early as it is possible to mea-
sure their behavior. Investigating, for example, children’s attribution of
mental states to group members across multiple age groups, including with
infants, could help to disentangle these different possibilities.
Another question relates to the contribution of environmental factors to
the development of dehumanization. If dehumanization is at least partially
learned, then it is important to explore what environmental cues might
influence its development. Previous research has demonstrated that dehu-
manizing descriptions (Esses et al., 2013; Goff et al., 2008; Vaes, Latrofa,
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Suitner, & Arcuri, 2017) and pictorial representations (Bleiker, Campbell,
Hutchison, &Nicholson, 2013) of perceived outgroups are common within
the media and that individuals differ in the ways in which they discuss the
behavior of social groups (Harris & Fiske, 2011; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, &
Semin, 1989; McLoughlin & Over, 2017a; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb, &
Diesendruck, 2015). Future research ought to investigate whether these
subtle differences in expression are sufficient to induce or exacerbate dehu-
manizing biases in young observers. Cross cultural research (for e.g., see
Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006; Lillard, 1998; Over & Uskul, 2016) will
be highly informative in understanding the contributing factors found in
children’s specific environments to this phenomenon. When contemplating
the role of learning, it is also interesting to consider whether the environ-
mental factors that influence the development of outgroup negativity
(Over et al., 2017), essentialism (Rhodes et al., 2012), and the perceived sta-
tus of social groups (Bigler et al., 2001) are similar to or different from the
environmental cues that influence dehumanization. In addition to this, it
will be important to identify the individual differences that matter in chil-
dren’s tendency to dehumanize others. For instance, research with adults has
shown that conservative (DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009) and national-
istic ideals (Viki & Calitri, 2008), as well as less knowledge of social out-
groups (Rodrı́guez Perez, Delgado Rodrı́guez, Betancor Rodrı́guez,
Leyens, & Vaes, 2011) are positively correlated with the extent to which
they dehumanize members of perceived outgroups.
Understanding the developmental origins of dehumanization may ulti-
mately help us to develop interventions to reduce its harmful consequences
in children’s everyday interactions (e.g., bullying; Menesini et al., 2003;
Pozzoli, Gini, & Vieno, 2012; Van Noorden et al., 2014). Beyond this,
research-led interventions may offer promising routes for tackling the
effects of dehumanization before they become deeply entrenched later in
development (Dunham & Degner, 2010). In a recent effort, McLoughlin
and Over (2017b) found that 5- and 6-year-olds who were encouraged
to mentalize about an immigrant group were more helpful toward a novel
victim belonging to that group. Mental state attribution is only one aspect
of this complex social phenomenon (Smith, 2012); therefore, future research
is required to explore whether reinforcing the humanity of vulnerable
social groups in other ways is successful in alleviating the negative, and often
detrimental, outcomes of dehumanization in young children (e.g., see
Albarello & Rubini, 2012; Bruneau, Cikara, & Saxe, 2015; Vezzali,
Capozza, Stathi, & Giovannini, 2012).
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7. CONCLUSION
Dehumanization has long been considered an important topic in
philosophy (Redeker, 2007; Rorty, 1993; Smith, 2014), sociology (Esses,
Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008), and social psychology (Bain,
Vaes, & Leyens, 2014; Kelman, 1973;Waytz, Epley, et al., 2010). However,
developmental researchers have only started to explore the concept of
dehumanization among children (Chas et al., 2015; Costello & Hodson,
2014; Martin et al., 2008; McLoughlin & Over, 2017a; McLoughlin
et al., 2017; Van Noorden et al., 2014). In this chapter, we sought to sum-
marize the recent developmental research and reflect on the origins of this
complex intergroup bias. We hope that our review will serve as a spring-
board for future research to investigate the ways in which developmental
psychology can contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon more
generally.
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